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INTRODUCTION
We are going to devote most of our attention in this talk to the RSA Public Key Cryp~
tosystem because it not only remains unbroken but it has some other useful features for
digital signatures and authentication.
We will briefly mention some other methods which have been compromised to some
degree, and one, McEliece' s which has not, but which are still valid when both keys are
kept secret and some have other features which may be useful.
PUBLIC KEY SYSTEMS

A public key cryptosystem is a cryptographic system in which each encryption process is
governed by not one but two keys. The two keys are inverses of each other, that is to say
anything encrypted with one can be decrypted with the other and vice versa. The important additional property of a public key crptosystem is that given one of the keys, it is
extremely difficult to find the other. This allows one of the keys to be made public while
its inverse is kept secret, giving the systems their name. Public key cryptosystems have
two very important properties.
Because it is not necessary to keep both of the keys secret, one can be made readily available, published in a phonebook for example. Anyone wanting to transmit a confidential
message can encrypt it in the public key of the addressee with assurance that only the
addressee will be able to read it.
Just as a message encrypted in a public key can be produced by anyone but can only be
read by the holder of the corresponding secret key, a message encrypted in a secret key, a
message encrypted in a secret key can be read by anyone. using the corresponding public
key, but could only have been produced by the holder of the secret key. This gives it the
fundamental property of a signature.
Use is made of modular arithmetic.
Mathematicians write the expression

a :;b(mod m)
(a is congruent to b modulo m) to denote the fact that the integer m divides exactly the
difference of the integers a and b. For example,

32:; -4(mod 12).
Note that if the remainder on dividing a by m is b, then a == b (mod m). Hence,

5124491" 12172(mod 21753).
In fact, the remainder on dividing a by m is the only number b which is congruent to a
modulo m such that 0 $; b < m. One very important cosequence of the definition of
congruence is that if p (x) is any polynomial function of x with integer coefficients, then
p (0)" p(b)(mod m) whenever 0" b(mod m).
PUBLIC KEY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

A public key distribution system is a mechanism which allows two people who have
never had any prior secure contact to establish a secure channel "out of thin air", Public
key distribution systems do not provide any signature mechanism but, at present, some
are faster and more compact than public key cryptosystems which makes them better for
many applications.
The first practical public key distribution system makes use of the apparent difficulty of
computing logarithms over a finite (Galois) field GF(q) with a prime number q of elements (the numbers (O,I, ... ,q-I) under arithmetic mod q). Let
Y=axmod q,for 1 <X < q -I,

where a. is a fixed primitive element of GF(q) (that is the powers of a range over the
nonzero elements 1,2,...•q-l of GF(q)), then X is referred to as the logarithm of Y to the
base a, over GF(q):
X = log.Y over GF(q), for 1 < Y < q - 1 .
Calculation of Y from X is easy, taking at most 2log2q multiplications. For example
a18 = «(a2h 2*a2 .

Computing X from Y, on the other hand can be much more difficult and, using the best
known algorithm, has a computional complexity similar to finding the factors of a
number close to q. Each user generates an independent random number Xi chosen unifonnly from the set ofintegers 1,2, ... ,q-1. Xi is kept secret but

x·

Yj=a 'mod q
is placed in a public file with the addressee's name and address. When users i and j wish
to communicate privately they use

xx·J mod q

Kij=U '

as their key. User i computes Kij by obtaining Yj from the public file and letting
Kij

=Y7' mod q =(ax, l'mod q

User j obtains K jj in similar fashion.
Thus

Kij = yJimod q
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and of course

xx-lmodq.
a X;X-. =a'
Another user must compute Kij from Yi and Y j , for example by computing
K~~g(l.Yi =ai mod q
'I

before his/her own X" can be used to establish a bogus key
X· XI;

K,,=(a ') modq.

If logarithms over GF(q) are easily computed, the system can be broken, but at present
neither a threateningly fast method of doing this computation nor a way to bypass the
logarithm and compute Kij from Yj and Yj without first obtaining either Xi or Xj is
known. If q is a prime slightly less than w, all quantities are representable as w bit
numbers. Exponentiation then takes at most 2xw multiplications over GF(q), while com·
puting the logarithm requires q'A = 2w12 operations, using the best currently known algo·
rithm. The cryptanalytic effort therefore grows exponentially relative to encryption or
decryption. If w = 200, at most 400 multiplications are required to compute Yi from Xi,
or Kij from Xi and Xj' yet taking logarithms over GF(q) is thought to require 2 100 or
approximately 1030 operations. This system can be implemented efficiently with respect
to both speed and storage, and a variation in which q is not prime was the basis for an
experimental local secure network at the Mitre Corporation.

In the next sections we will see how modular arithmetic is used to convert the two problems, factorization and discrete logarithms, to public key cryptosystems. In fact, except
for the scheme described by McEliece (see later) and Sloane, all known possible publIc
key techniques are based on these two problems.
THE RSA PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM.
Shortly after the publication of Diffie and Hellman's seminal paper on public key cryp·
tosystems, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (for whom the RSA system is named)
discovered a very elegant candidate for such a scheme. Their technique makes use of the
following simple number theoretic result: if R = pq, where p, q are distinct primes, and
$(R)=(P-l)(Q-l), then
X¥R) " l(mod R),

for any X which is not divisible by either P or Q. The designer of an RSA cryptosystem
selects at random two large (about 100 digits) primes P and Q and calculates R = PQ.
The designer also selects at random a value e( <R) such that the greatest common divisor
of e and $(R) (denoted here by (e, $(R))) is 1. The congruence
de" 1(mod $(R)),

is then solved for d such that 0 < d < R. There is a simple procedure for doing this,
based on the Euclidean algorithm, which requires O(logR) operations. For this scheme
the public encryption key is K 1= {e,R} and the secret decryption key is K 2 = d.
If some individual wishes to send a secure message M (such that gcd(M, R) = I and
M < R) to the designer of this system,
3

is sent where 0 < C < R. The designer calculates
D (C)" Cd" M,d "M1+kO(R) ,,(mod R).

Since M < R, it can now be uniquely determined. It might appear that the problem of calculating Me(mod R) for large e is very time consuming. In fact. there is a very simple
and fast method for doing this which takes 0 (log2e) steps to complete. Briefly, it is
done by performing a sequence of squaring and multiplication by M operations as indicated by the binary representation of e (see [SEPI]).
Consider the following simple example. Here we put p = 11, q = 19, R = 209, e = 17.
We find that <I>(R)=1O.18 and

17d" I(mod 180)
for d = 53. IfM = 5, then

C" 517 " ((52)

2)X)2

.5", 80(mod 209) and C = 80.

To decrypt C, we calculate

80" " ((((802.80)2), .80)2)' .80" 5(mod 209).
The security of this scheme depends very much on the difficulty of factoring R. If a cryptanalyst can factor R, d can be readily calculated and thus all ciphertext can be decrypted.
There are a large number of different factoring methods currently known (see Guy
[GUY]), but the most powerful of these techniques (Dixon [DIXO] and Schroeppe1
[SCHR]) still require about

e ..JiogNloglogN
operations to factor N. Thus, a very fast computer (one multiprecise operation per 10-6
seconds) might require 3.8xl09 years to factor a 200 digit number. It must be stressed
here that many numbers which are very large can be factored relatively easily when their
prime factors have certain special fonns. As an extreme example of this, we mention that
it is known that the truly immense number
224724 +1

has 29.24727 +1 as a factor. Hence, great care must be taken by the designer of this type
of cryptosystem when selecting primes P and Q. This problem has been discussed in
Rivest [RIVE] and Williams and Schmid [WISC]. Although it is true that anyone who
can factor R can decrypt messages sent under this scheme, it is not know whether the act
of decrypting these messages is equivalent in difficulty to factoring R. Simmons and
Norris [SINO] and Herlestam [HERL] have attacked this cryptosystem by using the fact
that if some P can be found such that

then M can be found without having to factor R. But in [WISC] it is shown that
the chance of finding such a value of P by a random search is very very small for

.
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large, properly selected values of P and Q;
a fast method of finding P can almost certainly be converted into a fast method of
factoring R.
Thus, it seems that, if the system designer has selected the value of R carefully, revealing
its value and that of e gives too little information to a cryptanalyst in order for d to be
deduced. For this reason it is felt that the RSA scheme is a valid public key cryptosystern.
In summary, we point out that this system has several important and desirable properties.
It seems to be very secure (so far).
The key size is small.
It is also a signature scheme.
Unfortunately, it also possesses some disadvantages.
The processes of encryption and decryption are expensive. Approximately one
second is needed per 6000 bits of information on a special purpose piece of
hardware constructed at M.LT. (L. Adleman, personal communication).
Determination of suitable keys is somewhat expensive.
Reblocking of the message or two different R values are required when the system
is used for signatures.
We conclude this section by mentioning that some other cryptosystems have been
developed which also use the difficulty of factoring as their means of providing security.
One of these, the Lu-Lee (COMSAT) system [LULE], has been broken by Adleman and
Rivest [ADRI] and others. Rabin [RAB!], Khoo, Bird and Seberry [KHBI], and Williams [WILL] have presented public key cryptosystems for which it can be shown that
decryption is equivalent in difficulty to factoring. In view of this it would seem that these
systems are superior to the RSA system; however, because of the constructive nature of
the proofs of their security, all of these schemes may be susceptible to a selected ciphertext attack [WILL]. This difficulty can be overcome by setting up the system very carefully, but the resulting schemes are somewhat cumbersome. It would be very desirable to
have a nonconstructive proof of the equivalence of the problem of breaking the RSA system and the problem of factoring; at the moment, this seems very far from being
achieved.
TRAPDOOR KNAPSACKS
Another public key system is called the "trapdoor knapsack system," a name imaginatively derived from the notion of attempting to choose just the right set of rods from
those in a box so that when packed into a long thing knapsack, the rods would fit tightly
and not rattle.
Trapdoor knapsacks have their roots in a field called combinatorial mathematics and
depend on the fact that given a list of numbers it is easy to add up any specified subset,
but given instead a list of numbers and a sum it is extremely difficult to discover a subset
5

which totals to exactly that sum. In order to do encryption in this system, the input block
is treated as a specification of which numbers are to be selected from a list and added up;
the output is their sum. The trapdoor knapsack system is based on Merkle's discovery
that if the list of numbers is constructed correctly, certain details of that construction con·
stitute a secret key which allows the constructor to take the sum and discover which
members of the list were added.
Given a vector of integers a ::;: (a1,a2, ...• an) and an integer S, the knapsack problem
is to find a subset of the aj such that the sum of the elements of the subset is equal to S.
Equivalently, given a and S find a binary n·vector x such that a'x = S.
The knapsack problem is believed to be extremely difficult in general. belonging to a
class of problems (the NP complete problems) that are thought not to be solvable in poly·
nomial time on any detenninistic computer.
Some cases of the knapsack problem are quite simple, however, and Merkle and
Hellman's technique is to start with a simple one and convert it into a more complex
fonn.
The vector a can be used to encipher a block by fonning the dot product S ::;: a·x.
Recovery of x from S involves solving a knapsack problem and was thus believed to be
computationally infeasible if a and x are chosen randomly.

If the vector a is selected so that each element is larger than the sum of the preceding ele·
ments and each of the Xj is either 0 or I, its knapsack problem is very simple. For exam·
pIe, if
a • = (171,197,459,1191,2410) and

x = (Xl,X2,X3,X4,XS)
S' = 3798
then x 5 must equal 1. If it were 0 then even if Xl = X2 = X3 = x4 =1, the dot product a'x
would be too small. Then, knowing that x 5 = I,

S• -

a,• =3798 - 2410 = 1388.

must be a sum of a subset of the first four elements of x. Because 1388 > a; = 1191. x
must equal 1. Finally

SOX3=O,x2=I,andxl=O.
This simple knapsack vector a* cannot be used as a public enciphering key because anyone can easily recover x from S. The algorithim for generating public keys therefore gen·
erates a random simple knapsack vector a * (with a hundred or more components) and
keeps a * secret. It also generates a random number m which is larger than D:J.* and a
random pair w, w- 1 such that l-VW- 1 = 1 mod m. It then generates the public knapsack
vector or enciphering key Jl by mUltiplying each components of ex* by w mod m.
jl=w·a* modm.
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When another user wishes to send the message x to A he computes

S=Ct•'x
and sends this to A. A uses his secret informati6n. w- 1 and m to compute

S* =wS mod m
=w-1LajXj mod m
=w-1L(wa.; mod m)xi mod m

=I:(w-1wo.; mod m)xj mod m
=a•'X
because m > La *. For example. if the secret vector 0;* is as above, then w :::; 2550 and M
:::; 8443, results in the public vector,

a = (5457,4213,5316,6013,7439),
which hides the structure present in 0;*.
The vector 0;* is published by the user as a public key. while the parameters w- 1 and m
are kept secret as the private key. They can be used to decipher any message which has
been enciphered with the user's public key, by computing

S* :;:: w-1Srnod m
and then solving the simple knapsack

S • =0;•·x.
This process can be iterated to produce a sequence of vectors with seemingly more
difficult knapsack problems by using transformations (wt> ml). (W2, m2), etc. The
overall transformation is not, in general, equivalent to any single (w,rn) transfonnation.
The trapdoor knapsack system requires special adaptation when used to produce signatures [SEPI]. Unlike the RSA system, knapsack systems are quite fast and speeds of one
megabit appear easy to obtain. Unfortunately, the public keys are quite large, requiring
approximately ten-thousand bits.

MERKLE· HELLMAN CRYPTOSYSTEM
The first asymmetric cryptosystem based on the Knapsack Problem was invented by Merkle and Hellman [MEHE781. The Merkle·Hellman cryptosystem (MH system) allows n·
bit mess sages to be enciphered,
(I)

where rnj

E

{O,l} fori = l, ... ,n, using the public key K

K=(kt,k 2 ,
where kj

E Zq :::;

•.•

,k.).

(2)

{1,2 ... , q-I} for i :::; I •...• n. and the integer q is prime. Using the pair

·
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(M, K), the sender A creates the cryptogram C according to the following formula:
n

C = Lmiki,

(3)

i=l

The enciphering process is extremely simple for it runs in linear time. To continue the
description, we now consider the receiver B who always initiates the algorithm (the system). The receiver first chooses the initial condition which is a sequence of superincreasing integers

(4)
where Wi: i = 1, ... ,n, are an integers which satisfy an inequality in the form:
i-I

Wi>

,Lwr

(5)

j=l

Note that the initial condition W defines the instance of the Easy Knapsack Problem
which is solvable in linear time (see [SEPID. Now the designer B transfonns the instance
of the Knapsack Problem. To do this, B first determines a suitable field blodZq (q must be
prime and a multiplier r e Zq. Both q and r are usually chosen at random provided that
n

q> LWi'
i=l

Next, he/she injects the vector W into the field Zq according to the following congruence:

ki

;::

,n.

wjr(mod q); i;:: 1, '"

(6)

The vector K :::::(k 1 , •.. , kn)is sent to the sender A via an insecure channel while the triple
(the initial condition W, the integer r, the modulus q) is kept secret by the receiver.
Assume now that the receiver A has obtained the cryptogram generated using (3). First
of all, B transfonns the cryptogram as follows:

C' = Cr-' (mod q),
From (3) and (5), we have

n

(7)
n

C· == C,-l ;:: r.kimj,-l ;:: LWjmj(mod q).
i=1

;=1

(8)

As Wi fulfills (5), the receiver easily finds components mi of the message M.
Example. To illustrate the Merkle-Hellman system, assume that 5 bit messages are to be
transmitted. The receiver initiates the algorithm by choosing the vector

w = (w" w2, w3, W4,WS) = (2,3,6,12,25),
Note that
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W4 >WI +w2w+3, and
Ws >Wt +W2+w3+w4'

Next he/she chooses the pair (r,q) at random provided that q is prime and

q >wl +W2+W3+W4=48. Let q = 53 and r = 46. It is easy to check that
r- 1 = 15(mod 53). Subsequently, the receiver calculates the public key using (3.42),
namely
k,

~

k2
k3
k4
ks

~
~
~
~

w,r(mod q) ~ 39 (mod 53),
w2r(mod q) ~ 32 (mod 53),
w3r(mod q) ~ 11 (mod 53),
w 4r(mod q) ~ 23 (mod 53),
wsr(mod q) ~ 37 (mod 53).

So, the public key
K~(k"

k2' k3, k4' ks)

~~(39,32,11,22,37)

is sent to the sender. Suppose now that the receiver has obtained the cryptogram C=119.
To decrypt it, he/she first transfonns it as follows:

C' ~ Cr-' ~ 119·15 ~ 36(mod 53),
and next solves the simple knapsack problem:

as C • ~36 > Ws

as C • -

we get ms

< W4 we get

~

I,

=0,
-ws = 11 >w3 =6weget m3 = I,

as C· -ws = 11

ase·

~25

Ws - W3 =

m4

5 > W2 = 3 we get m2 = 1,

In other words the receiver has recreated the message M=(I,I,I,O,I).

Shamir and Zippel [SHA80b] showed that, if the modulus q is compromised, the multiplier r can be readily calculated from the public key K. The obvious remedy is multiple
applications of the initial condition in several different fields, i.e., W is injected into
Zq\ Zq2' ... using multipliers rl,T2.···, and primes qj satisfying the inequality
q 1'< Q2<"" The resulting cryptosystem is called the multiply iterated knapsack system.

GRAHAM-SHAMIR CRYPTOSYSTEM
Graham and Shamir [LEMP79] independently discovered a variant of the MerkleHellman system to obscure the superincreasing property of initial conditions. A Graham
Shamir initial condition vector W=(w I, ... ,wlI ) has the property that each Wj has the following binary representation:

W;=R/jSj,
where Rj and Sj are long random bit strings, and I is a bit string of length n such that
j-th high-order bit is 1 and the remaining n-l bits are O's. Each random bit string Sj
has log2n zero's in its high-order bit positions so that summing them does not cause them
to overflow into the area of the Ij's. Thus. D = WxM has the binary representation
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D=(R,M,Sl,
n

n

whereR = I,Rjmj and S = I,Sjmj. Now the vector of bit strings «In, Sn), ... ,(I" S I»~
j=l

j=l

is a easy knapsack vector. The R/s are added to obscure the superincreasing property.
These knapsacks are even easier to solve than Merkle-Hellman trapdoor knapsacks
because M can be extracted from the binary representation of D.
Example. Let n =5 when W is given by

w,

(R ,I, S I) = (011010 10000 000101) =
(R212 S2) =(00100101000000011) =w2
(R3 13 S3) =(010010 00100 000100) =W3
(R 4 14 S4) =(011000 00010 000111) =w4
(R 515 S 5) = (000110 00001000001) = w5'
Let the message be M=(O,I,O,O,I). Then
D = WxM =w2 +w5
= (R2 + R 5; 12 + 15; S2 + S 5) = (00111101001000100).
The initial condition W is converted to a hard knapsack vector K as in Merkle-Hellman
scheme, by picking q and r and computing K = rW (mod q). Similarly. a message M is
n

enciphered as in the Merkle-Hellman system, whence C = Lkjmj. At the receiver's end,
i=1

C is deciphered by computing D=Cr-' (mod q) and extracting from D the bits representingM.
Shamir and Graham believed this variant was safer, faster and simpler to implement than
original scheme proposed by Merkle and Hellman. It has been broken by A. Sharnir.

SECURITY OF THE MERKLE-HELLMAN SYSTEM
Merkle and Hellman originally suggested using knapsacks of approximate size n=lOO.
However, Schroeppel and Shamir [SCHR79] developed an algorithm to solve knapsacks
of this size. By trading time and space their methexl can solve the knapsack problem in
time T = O(2~n) and space O(2nI4 ). For n = 100, T = 250 ;::: lOiS. Thus a single processor can find a solution in 11,574 days. But for n=200, assuming 8.64 xlO IO instructions
per day, the algorithm is computationally infeasible.
The Merkle-Hellman system has two drawbacks which arise from its construction. They
are the high cryptogram redundancy and the huge public key length. For n=200, every
key component is 4OO-bit sequence, so the public key
Once Merkle and Hellman had announced their cryptosystem, many scientists tried to
break it. Merkle promised a prize of 1000 dollars to the first person to successfully crack
his system. There are basically two attacks on the Merkle-Hellman system. The first
relies upon finding an efficient algorithm to solve knapsacks defined in the fOIm required
by the system. While there is no efficient algorithm to solve the general knapsack as it
belongs to the class NPC, the knapsacks in question are only a small subset of all knapsacks.
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The second attack is based on the knowledge of the public key only. The public key
creates the hard knapsack. A number of articles addressed the following question: is
there an pOlynomial time algorithm to calculate easy knapsacks (initial conditions) knowing the hard ones (public keys). Subsequently an algorithm was invented by Shamir
([SHAM82]. Shamir's algorithm works for the basic Merkle-Hellman system only and
not for all hard knapsacks vectors. At the same time Adleman [ADLE82, ADLE83]
examined the iterated Merkle-Hellman system and showed that even this system is
insecure. Some comments on his attack can be found in [BRI83c]. Next, Brickell

[BRl83b] and Lagarias et al [LAG83b] proved that any cryptosystem based on low density knapsacks (the Merkle-Hellman system is one such knapsack) is breakable in poly-

nomial time. Subsequently, Lagarias [LAG82, LAG83a] examined applications of
simultaneous diophantine approximation problems (see [CASS65]) to design a polynomial time algorithm for breaking knapsack cryptosystems.
The Merkle-Hellman system was finally shown to be insecure by Brickell (BRI84a,
BRI851 who invented a polynomial time algorithm which allowed the easy knapsack vectors to be recreated from the hard knapsack vectors. Brickell's algorithm was based upon
the recently published algorithm for factoring polynomials with rational coefficients, due

to LenSlra, Lenslra, and Lovasz [LEN82, LEN83]. Needless to say that Bricken won
Merkle's prize of 1000 dollars. Readers interested in details of breaking the MerkleHellman system are referred to two papers of Brickell et al [BRI83a, BRI83d] or the

book by OConnor and Seberry [OCSE87].

CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON IDEMPOTENT ELEMENTS (PIEPRZYK)
There are many modifications of the Merkle-Hellman system. We consider one of them
described in [PIEP85]. In this modification called IE system, the simple knapsack is
defined differently using idempotent elements. As before the system encrypts n-bit messages. The initial condition, however, consists of n different primes PI, ... ,Pn' If we
accept thatN =Pl ....Pn' then the set ZN = {I, .... N-IJ, along with addition and multiplication modulo N defines a suitable arithmetic. The Chinese Remainder Theorem says
that any integer a E ZN can be uniquely presented in the fonn of the vector:
[al,"', an]; [a(modpl)"", a (modPn)]'

Now there are n elementary idempotent elements of the fonn:
el ; [l(mod PI), O(mod P2),"" O(mod Pn)]; [1,0, ... ,0]
e2 ; [O(mod PI), I (mod P2),"" O(mod Pn)]; [0,1, ... ,0]

(9)

en; [O(mod PI), O(mod P2),"" l(mod PnO]; [0,0, ... , I].

The elements create an algebraic space and they can be used as basis vectors. To hide the
vectors and simultaneously create the public key. The idempotent elements are
transfonned using the random integer r and the modulus q as before, namely
'" ; rei (mod q); i=I, ... ,n,
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(10)

n

while q > !:ei and q is prime. Using the public key K=(k1 .... ,kn), the sender creates the
i=l

cryptogram C for the message M =(m 1-

.•• ,mn)

u

n

C = I I,kj,mj, -

both

subsets

of

binary

I, kj;mj; I;

(11)

i=u+l

i=l

where

according to the following formula:

elementary

messages

M+ = mh •... ,milt

and

I.··· ,mj are selected arbitrarily provided that M+ U M- ::; 0 contains all the
•
u+
",
+
- 0
bmaryelementsmi; l::; l •...• n, andM (")M = .

M- = mj

In turn, the receiver, having the cryptogram C, transforms it using the inverse r- 1 as fol-

lows:

C' = Cr-1(mod q).

(12)

Again, he/she calculates en ::;: N - C "'. As only one element of the pair (c", e") conveys
the message. the receiver presents them as vectors of the fonn:
C • =[C • mod PI> ... ,C • modPnl
C" = [C"mod p" ... ,C"mod Pn)

(13)

and selects the vector all of whose components are either -1 (mod Pi) or 1(mod pi) for
i=l, '" ,no Now if the cryptogram is generated by (11) and there is a vector, say C , all
of whose components are from the set {O,I,-l}, then the second one, C", must contain at
least one component (C" modpj) different from 0,1,-1 (modp·). To illustrate the enciphering and deciphering processes in IE system, consider the following example.
Example. Assume that the communicating parties have agreed to transmit 5-bit messages
and
the receiver
has
already
selected
the
initial
condition
(P"P2,P"P4,P5)~(2,3,5,711). Now N=p, . P2 . p, . P4 . Ps = 2310 and
el = [1

modPI, 0 mod P2, Omodpl, OmodP4, OmodpsJ = 1l55(mod 2310).

ez = [0 mod PI, 1 modp2, 0 mod Pl, OmodP4, OmodpsJ = 1545(mod 2310),

e3 "" [0 mod P I. 0 mod P2, 1 mod Pl, 0 mod P4, 0 mod Ps] = 1389(mod 2310),
e4 = [0 mod PI, 0 mod P2,

omod Pl, 1 mod P4, omod Ps] = 330(mod 2310),

es = [0 mod PI, 0 mod P2, 0 mod P3, 0 mod P4, 1 mod Ps];: 21O(mod 2310),
5

If the receiver now selects the modulus q = 4637 >

Lej = 4621

(q is prime) and picksr =

i=l

3475 at random (r- 1 = 3372), then components of the public key are:

k, =e,r(mod q) = 1155.3475 =2620(mod 4637),
k2 =e2r(mod q) = 1540.3475 =402(mod 4637),
k, =e,r(mod q) =1386.3475 =3144(mod 4637),
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k.
k,

=e.r(mod q) = 330.3475 = 1411(mod 4637),
=e,r(mod q) =210.3475 = 1741(mod 4637).

In other words the public key is

K=(2620,402,3144,1411,1741 ).
Here, both the initial condition and the pair (r, q) are kept secret. Using K, the sender can
encipher his/her message M=(1,O,l,l,l). First, he/she constructs two subsets M+ and
M-, Let them be M+={ ml,m2,m4} and M- = { m3,mS}. Next he/she computes the
cryptogram

Finally, the cryptogram is forwarded to the receiver. In turn, the receiver, knowing the
inverse element r- 1 • transforms the cryptogram
C'

= Cr-1(mod q) = 854.3372 = l11(mod 4637).

Now, one element of the pair (C* = 111, en = N - C' = 1199) conveys the message. To
find this element, the receiver converts the pair into vectors
C' = [111(mod 2), 111(mod 3), 111(mod 5,) 111(mod 7), 111(mod 11)] = [1,0,1,6,1] = [1,0,1,-1,1],
C" = [1199(mod 2), 1199(mod 3), 1199(mod 5), 1199(mod 7), 1199(mod 11) = [1,2,',2,0].

The first vector indicates the message m = [1,0,1,1,1].

OTHER PROPOSALS FOR PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS,
Some other cryptosystems have also been developed which are based on the knapsack
problem but we cannot develop them futher here.

Leung and Vacon [LEVA] have presented a cryptosystem, designed around the knapsack
problem, which seemed to be very secure. Unfortunately, when this system was being
used, it was necessary to transmit 100 times more ciphertext than corresponding message
text. We also mention that Shamir [SHAM] has developed a signature scheme around
the knapsack problem. This scheme, while requiring a large key, is still very simple and
fast; however, it has been broken as a public syatem and was not designed to be used as
a cryptosystem.
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McELIECE'S ALGEBRAIC CODES CRYPTOSYSTEM
McEliece suggested in 1978 [MCEL78] that error correcting codes are excellent candi~
dates for providing public-key cryptosystems. His work has not received the prominence, or detailed study it deserves, because error correcting codes are effective by virtue
of their redundancy, which leads to data expansion, which has not usually been considered desirable in cryptography.
The author believes that when security is required on noisy channels, such as satellite
communications, mobile radios or car telephones, error correction incorporated with
security is the wisest course to take. It may be that encryption should be applied first and
then error correction via, say convolutional codes is most appropriate. Nevertheless, the
combined area of encryption and error correction, is valuable to study for both digital and
analogue systems.

McEliece based his cryptosystem on the Goppa codes, a superset of the BCH or the
Hamming polynomial codes, because they are easy to implement in hardware and a fast
decoding algorithm exists for the general Goppa cods while no such fast decoding algorithm exists for a general linear code.
Corresponding to each irreducible pOlynomial,

of degree t over GF(2m ), there exists a binary irreducible Goppa code of length n =2m.
dimension k > n -tm, capable of correcting any pattern of t or fewer errors.
Patterson has given a fast algorithm, with running time, O(nt), for decoding these codes
(see[MCEL77, Problem S.IS)).
The cryptosystem designer now chooses a desirable value of n and t and then randomly
picks an irreducible polynomial of degree t over GF(2m ). The probability that a randomly
selected polynomial of degree t is irreducible is about lit and Berlekamp [BERL6S,
Chapter 8] describes a fast algorithm for testing irreducibility so this is a reasonable step.
Next the system designer produces a kxn generator matrix G for the code, which could
be in canonical form, that is

G = [It F,x(n-k)].
The usual error correction method would now multiply a message vector a =
(a}ta2 ..... ak) onto G to fonn the codeword b = (b}tb2 • ... bn ) which is transmitted via
a channel which usually corrupts the codeword to b l which must be then corrected and
then the message recovered.
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If a were multiplied onto G in the canonical fonn b would be

and if there was no corruption the message is trivially recovered as the first k bits of h.
Thus McEliece "scrambles" G by selecting a random dense kxk nonsingular matrix S,
and a random nXn pennutation matrix P. He then computes

G' =SGP'
which generates a linear code with the same rate and minimum distance as the code generated by G. G' is called the public generator matrix.
Sloane [SLOA79] has written an excellent article describing how the random matrices S
and P can be obtained.
Thus the algorithm can be described as
Encryption: Divide the data to be encrypted into k-bit blocks. If u is such a block,
transmit x = uG' + z where G' is the public generator matrix and z is a locally generated random vector of length n and weight t.
Decryption: On receipt of x the receiver computes x'xp- 1 where p-l is the inverse
of the permutation matrix P. x' will then be a codeword of the Gappa code previously chosen.
The decoding algorithm is then used to find u = U'S-1

SECURITY OF McELEICE'S CRYPTOSYSTEM.
The encryption and description algorithms can be implemented quite simply. We need to
determine the security of the system. If an opponent knows G' and intercepts x can
helshe' recover u. There are two possible attacks:
to try to recover G from G' and so be able to use the decoding algorithm;
to attempt to recover u from x without knowing G.
The first attack appears hopeless if n and t are large enough because there are so many
possibilities for G, not to mention the possibilities for S and P.
The second attack seems more promising but the basic problem to be solved is that of
decoding a more or less arbitrary (n, k) linear code in the presence of up to terrors.
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Berlekamp, McEliece and van Tilborg [BEM178] have proved that the general coding
problem for linear codes if NP-complete, so one can certainly expect that if the code
parameters are large enough, that this attack too will be infeasible.
Example. If n=1024=2 sup 10 and 1=50 there are about 10 149 possible Goppa polynomials and vast number of choices for San P. The dimension of the code will be about 524.
Hence, a brute-force approach to decoding based on comparing x to each codeword has a
work factor of about S524=10 158 ; and a brute-force approach based on coset leaders has a
work factor of about 2500 = 10 151 •
A more promising attack is to select k of the coordinates randomly and hope none are in
error and then calcu!ate u. The probability of no error, however, is about
(I-lin)',

and the amount of work involved in solving k simultaneous equations in k unknowns is
about k 3 • Hence before finding u using this attack one expects a work factor of

For n;\024,k;524,1;50 this is about \019=2 65 .

Remark. This algorithm would have a communication rate of about 106 bits/sec so
would have quite viable implication speeds. On the other hand this cryptosystern is not
suitable for producing "signatures" as the algorithm is truly asymmetric and not one to
one. Other authors e.g. Kak [KAK83], have discussed joint encryption and errorcorrection coding suggested further avenues for research.
In this section and the last we have seen that many possible public key cryptosystems
have been developed. Even though all of them have certain disadvantages. if not secure
for secret public key use, several of them may. with limited usage, be used for the very
important task of exchanging the secret keys needed by certified conventional cryptosysterns. The exchanging of these keys, a very important proble which has not, in general
been satisfactority solved. need not take place very often but must be done in an environment of extreme security.

CONCLUSION
In spite of the number of proposed public key cryptosystems. it must be stressed here that
we are still a long way from demonstrating that any of them is provably secure. Since the
problem of factoring is so old, it might be felt that a scheme which is as difficult to break
as it is difficult to factor a certain large number is. in a sense. certified in its security.
However, it could be that in the future someone might develop a method that can be used
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to factor numbers of a certain (but now unknown) type. In a directory of public keys for
cryptosystems based on the factoring problem there could be several schemes whose
security would be compromised by this discovery. At the moment we simply have no
way of knowing whether this could occur.
Also. it should not be forgotten that there is the possibility that no such thing as a provably secure public key cryptosystem exists. This would certainly seem to be the case if it
were ever proved that P = nCo--NP [SEPlj.
The simple elegance and beauty of several of these recent public key encryption schemes
should not be allowed to lull us into a feeling of complacency.
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